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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment's right o effective assistance of counsel
rests on defense counsel for the accused zealously and thoroughly in-
vestigating his client's case in order to present a viable defense.
However, in far too many cases, defense attorneys conduct no investi-
gation, hire no experts to assess physical evidence, and call no wit-
nesses. Such inaction leaves a defendant not only convicted of crimi-
nal charges but hamstrung in his ability to bring constitutional
challenges during his state and federal appeals. For both Floyd Per-
kins and Carlos Trevino their direct appeal counsel failed to properly
raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims which precluded their
ability to have their constitutional claims reviewed by later appellate
courts. However, the legal treatment of these two men differed even
though the underlying issue, the absence of factual development of
constitutional claims, affected them the same.
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In the Supreme Court's 2012 term, it decided both McQuiggin v.
Perkins' and Trevino v. Thaler,' two cases involving the repercussions of
the untimely presentation of factual evidence in federal habeas cor-
pus. In Perkins, those with colorable claims of actual innocence filed
beyond the one year statute of limitations may receive review of their
habeas petitions so long as federal courts consider the delay when
evaluating whether the inmate is actually innocent.3 The amount of
flexibility in deciding untimely innocence petitions is questionable
given the Court's discussion during the McQuiggin v. Perkins oral ar-
gument and subsequent opinion. Where an inmate takes years be-
yond the statute of limitations to file his innocence habeas petition,
such a delay may undermine the credibility of his factual evidence.
When evaluating the delay beyond the statute of limitations, federal
courts must take into account whether the inmate: 1) had effective
assistance of counsel in the trial and appellate phases; and 2) is cur-
rently represented or pro se in federal habeas corpus proceedings."
Focusing on these two points helps clarify why an inmate's federal ac-
tion was untimely because inmates must explain why their factual de-
velopment could not have been presented in earlier appeals. Coun-
sel representing someone wrongfully convicted must correct lapses in
factual investigation in order to substantiate a federal procedural in-
nocence claim. Federal courts are already instructed to consider the
repercussions of lax factual development for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Martinez v. Ryan6 and Trevino v.
ThalW emphasize the importance of full, factual investigation that
must occur during pretrial proceedings. Defense counsel is constitu-
tionally obligated to complete this investigation during that time pe-
riod. When collateral counsel fails to raise ineffective assistance of
counsel for trial counsel's failures, habeas counsel now has a proce-
dural pathway to systematically address a valid Sixth Amendment
1 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013).
2 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
3 Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
4 See Id. at 1928 ("We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are
rare.... Our opinion clarifies that a federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence
gateway claim, should count unjustifiable delay .. .as a factor in determining whether ac-
tual innocence has been reliably shown."); Transcript of Oral Argument, Perkins, 133 S.
Ct. 1924 (2013) (No. 12-126) (demonstrating the sharp disagreement between the Justic-
es as to the extent of flexibility allowed).
5 See generally Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012); Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911.
6 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19.
7 133 S. Ct. at 1918-19.
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claim. The problem arises over the difference between the federal
court's treatment of actual innocence gateway claims compared with
ineffective assistance of counsel constitutional claims. As a practical
matter, raising ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas peti-
tions now provides an easier means to constitutional relief than actual
innocence claims given the Supreme Court's constantly evolving in-
terpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA").
When innocence is at issue, federal courts should leniently evalu-
ate innocence-gateway petitions filed beyond the statute of limitations
because these delays are necessary to satisfy the high factual burden
of proof. Wrongfully convicted people face delays in promptly bring-
ing their evidence because they need proof consisting of witness in-
terviews, physical evidence, or records in the custody of various state
and federal agencies to validate their claim-all of which is nearly
impossible to gather while locked in a jail cell.8 Yet, these legal hur-
dles must be addressed by the wrongfully convicted as they seek to
build a colorable claim of actual innocence.
The limited number of competent counsel representing those
who are actually innocent further exacerbates the problem given that
these attorneys must review, investigate, and navigate their cases
through numerous state and federal procedural hurdles. Inmates
who have potential claims of actual innocence often wait years for in-
nocence based organizations to assist them if they hope to successful-
ly navigate the complex world of criminal collateral appeals. Inmates
who cannot obtain representation must file both state post-conviction
and federal habeas petitions pro se, and with almost non-existent re-
sources to learn the law, conduct the requisite investigation, and
properly litigate their claims through the appellate process. In al-
most all cases, these inmates fail to obtain substantive review of their
claims, due not only to their struggles with the law, but also to their
failure to recover from deficiencies left for them to deal with by prior
counsel.
Floyd Perkins found himself having to represent himself in state
post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings after failing to
obtain legal counsel to assist him in establishing his actual inno-
cence.9  After waiting six years from the end of his state post-
8 See Daniel Givelber, The Right To Counsel In Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L.
REV. 1393, 1395, 1409 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of gathering evidence while in
prison and the lack of process guarantees post conviction that exacerbate the problem).
9 See Brief of Respondent at 10, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (No. 12-126)
(describing Perkins' efforts to obtain legal counsel prior to filing his petition pro se).
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conviction proceedings, he finally gave up seeking assistance and
filed his federal habeas petition pro se.0 During the eleven years
from the time his federal statute of limitations began to run, Perkins
and his family investigated and found evidence supporting his actual
innocence." During the oral argument and subsequent decision, the
Court's opinion cast significant doubt on the strength of his evidence
of actual innocence because of the delay. However, the Court failed
to appreciate why it took Perkins so long to file his habeas petition.
His delay stemmed from his lack of competent legal assistance in
gathering and litigating his case. Perkins relied on his family to aid
him in locating witnesses and gathering affidavits, who were un-
trained in how to satisfy Perkins' legal burdens." Moreover, Perkins
was incarcerated during this entire process, where he lost part of his
file when the prison flooded and a riot occurred.13 These impedi-
ments hampered his ability to properly comply with the one year
statute of limitations mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") ."
In contrast to Perkins' case, Martinez's post-conviction counsel
failed to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim as she
should have done under the Arizona court rules.'0 Instead, she ex-
plained to the court that there were no viable constitutional claims to
be raised." In reviewing his case, the Supreme Court found that Mar-
tinez's federal habeas counsel could assert "cause" for the ineffective
assistance of counsel of his post-conviction counsel for failing to raise
an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in accordance with
state law." If the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim were via-
ble, it would serve as prejudice for disregarding the state procedural
bar, allowing the federal court to reach the merits of the constitu-
tional claim. The Court's rationale rested on the importance of eval-
uating the factual development during the trial phase since ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel claims may only be properly evaluated
10 Id.
11 See Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1929 (discussing the three affidavits Perkins filed to support his
claim of actual innocence); Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9-10 (describing Per-
kins' attempts to gather additional evidence with the help of his sister).
12 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9-10.
13 Id.
14 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012).
15 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2012) (noting that Perkins' counsel neglected
to assert that trial counsel was ineffective and subsequently submitted a court filing ex-
plaining that she could not identify any viable claims altogether).
16 Id.
17 Id.
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in collateral proceedings.
Treating inmates arguing their actual innocence beyond the stat-
ute of limitations differently than those with ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is problematic because both groups suffer from the
same problem: their prior attorneys' negligence in investigating their
constitutional claims prevented them from complying with procedur-
al requirements of later appeals. Even though habeas corpus evalu-
ates these issues differently, the underlying basis for the problem is
the same. While the wrongfully convicted are allowed to file out of
time, when they do so without the benefit of proper counsel, their at-
tempts to explain the delay and the constitutional errors of prior
counsel may be legally inadequate. This is similarly the case for those
raising only ineffective assistance of counsel. The devastating ripple
effect which occurs when trial attorneys fail to adequately perform
within their constitutional mandate must be taken into account to a
greater extent for those averring actual innocence. Federal courts
need to adopt a lenient approach to the practical difficulties of bring-
ing new evidence of innocence in federal habeas corpus whether in-
effective assistance of counsel is raised or actual innocence.
Part I of this Article discusses the Court's treatment of Perkins
within the context of existing actual innocence jurisprudence. Part II
focuses on the difficulties inmates have in litigating their claims, ei-
ther pro se or through innocence projects. Part III looks into the
Court's Martinez and Trevino decisions in light of the need for counsel
to fully evaluate and gather evidence in order to protect the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. Finally, Part IV analyzes the inconsisten-
cies in the Court's jurisprudence between its treatment of inmates
raising only factually-related constitutional claims and that of in-
mates' development of new fact evidence. Part V suggests how feder-
al courts should interpret Perkins in light of the Court's procedural
expansion of ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. MCQUIGGIN V. PERKINS AND THE ELEVEN-YEAR DELAY
A. The Facts of the Case
Floyd Perkins was convicted of first degree murder in the death of
Rodney Henderson in Flint, Michigan." The trial court sentenced
him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.9 According to
Perkins, he, Henderson, and a third man, Damarr Jones, attended a
18 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 4.
19 Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1929.
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party the night of Henderson's murder. Later that evening, all three
left the party to go to a convenience store, after which Perkins left on
his own to go to his girlfriend's house. Jones and Henderson left on
their own.2 Later that night, as Perkins left his girlfriend's house, he
saw Jones covered in blood.' Criminologists later identified the
blood as being consistent with that of the victim, Henderson. During
Perkins' trial, the state's theory of the crime involved Perkins killing
Henderson while Jones watched. While all the physical evidence
largely pointed to Jones, the police and prosecution chose not to
charge him, even though they admitted he was involved in the homi-
cide.2 - The prosecution's willingness to accept Jones' version of
events was problematic given his motivations for wanting Henderson
dead:
Perkins testified that he and Henderson never fought. Their relationship
was limited to 'drink[ing] beer together, talk[ing] to girls, that was it.'
Jones, on the other hand, had a motive to kill Henderson, as Jones and
Henderson had previously been involved in a car theft, and rumors circu-
lated that Henderson had snitched to the police. Perkins had nothing to
24
do with the stolen car.
Perkins took the stand to explain his lack of involvement in Hender-
son's death and how Jones left with the victim after Perkins went to
buy cigarettes. The jury convicted Perkins sentencing him to life
without the possibility of parole.
Perkins took eleven years to file his federal habeas petition be-
cause of the lack of factual development during earlier proceedings,
20 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 4-5.
21 Id.
22 Perkins, 133 S.Ct. at 1929.
23 Joint Appendix at 114, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2012) (No. 12-126) ("And
in particular, you heard him testify that he hasn't been promised anything, no charges
have been brought against him, but he hasn't been promised anything at all. And I want
you to know that because nobody is sitting here telling you that Damarr Jones is totally
innocent in this. I want you to know that. Nobody's foolish; all right. But in this particu-
lar trial, the issue is Perkins. Okay. So I just don't want you to get caught up in Damarr
Jones right now. The evidence shows that DamarrJones was involved; okay. But, it's Per-
kins right now.")
24 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 5-6; see aLsoJoint Appendix, supra note 23, at 95 (re-
counting Perkins' trial testimony about his relationship with Rodney Henderson); Ap
pendix to Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at 468, 484, 488, Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d
665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1875) (explaining that Jones may have had a much
stronger motive to commit the murder).
25 See Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1929 (recounting Perkins' testimony that he did not commit the
murder).
26 Id.
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namely at trial and direct appeal." By the time Perkins began repre-
senting himself in state post-conviction proceedings, it was too late to
conduct much factual development due to his incarceration. The
Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel during
both trial and first appeal, i.e. direct appeal." For Perkins, his trial
counsel did little to develop his alibi or present other evidence prov-
ing his innocence.9 Perkins filed a pro se appellate motion after his
direct appeal counsel neglected to include a newly discovered evi-
dence claim based on two affidavits of Jones' confession to the mur-
der.0 The only ineffective assistance of counsel claims ever raised on
his behalf were by Perkins filing pro se in his supplemental brief on
direct appeal and again during state post-conviction proceedings.
Contrary to the assertion that Perkins intentionally sat on evidence
showing his innocence, he presented affidavits showing innocence at
the first available opportunity on both direct appeal and state post-
conviction proceedings; however, the state courts gave no credence
to the pro se claims.32 Because of the ineffective assistance of both his
trial and appellate counsel, Perkins faced significant obstacles both
27 The three levels of review for felony convictions-direct appeal, state post-conviction, and
federal habeas corpus-allow state prisoners to challenge their convictions in both state
and federal court. Substantive claims raised in each appeal vary considerably depending
on the state criminal code. In many states, direct appeal is limited to the four corners of
the trial record, which means that only the errors appearing in the transcript may be
raised. Because of the complexity of both state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus
proceedings, the failure to properly raise the legal basis along with all supporting facts
can result in both systems dismissing the case on procedural grounds. The Supreme
Court has made clear that constitutional claims exceeding the scope of the trial record,
such as some ineffective assistance of counsel claims, must be brought at the first available
opportunity, i.e. either on direct appeal or state post-conviction proceedings. Tiffany
Murphy, Futility of Exhaustion: Why Brady Claims Should Trump Federal Exhaustion Require-
ments, 47 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 697, 707-08 (2014).
28 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984) (holding that some error by counsel
was harmless and did not substantiate a habeus claim); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that direct appeal counsel must be effective under the Sixth
Amendment).
29 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9-10.
30 Id. at 6-7.
31 Id. Interestingly, Perkins might have been more successful asserting his innocence argu-
ing cause and prejudice under Martinez and Trevino given the lapses in his counsel and
the failure to provide counsel in state post-conviction. See infra Part III; Givelber, supra
note 8, at 1410-12. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.6 & cmt, 4-4.1 & cmt., 4-8.3 & cmt., 4-8.6 & cmt.
(Am. Bar Ass'n, 3d 1993) (discussing the obligations of defense counsel to conduct a fac-
tual and legal investigation thoroughout all phases of a criminal case from charging
through appeals in both state and federal court).
32 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 6-8.
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procedurally and substantively in seeking to have a court give him a
full and fair review of his evidence.
Perkins' family members took up the mantle of investigating his
case when his attorneys failed to do so. They looked for witnesses not
presented during trial to substantiate his innocence. His sister,
Rhonda Hudson, drafted affidavits of conversations with people who
knew Jones and heard him brag about killing Henderson. One newly
discovered witness:
detailed a conversation between Hudson and Louis Ford in March 1993,
the month Henderson was murdered. Ford, who occasionally socialized
with Perkins, Jones, and Henderson, told Hudson that he had been at a
house where Jones had been bragging about stabbing Henderson. Jones
told Ford that he took his clothes to the cleaners and 'laughed about it.'
Ford refused to report this information to the police, but Hudson found
a dry-cleaning clerk who remembered a man matching Jones's descrip-
tion entering her store with blood-covered clothing.'"
Perkins filed this affidavit along with one from another witness,
Demond Louis, who had also heard Jones confess to killing Hender-
son and had gone with Jones to dump some of the bloody clothing
the day after Henderson's murder. Both of these affidavits were
presented to the state courts along with legal claims of actual inno-
cence. The state post-conviction court summarily denied relief with-
out ever assessing whether Perkins had competent counsel during ei-
ther his trial or direct appeal.5
What transpired next is what often faces those wrongfully convict-
ed. Without the assistance of counsel or investigators to review his
materials, Perkins was left on his own to gather the records, locate
and interview any other witnesses establishing his actual innocence,
and prepare a petition asserting the same in federal court. For Per-
kins, whose highest level of education was a GED, understanding and
gathering the relevant legal materials necessary for his appeals was
challenging. He sought for years to locate the transcripts and de-
fense files from his attorneys.
His family was finally successful in tracking down a third witness,
the dry cleaner who spoke with Jones immediately after Henderson's
33 Id. at 7.
34 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1929-30 (2013).
35 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 7-8.
36 Id. at 9-10; see also Brief Amicus Curiae For Former and Current Law Enforcement Offi-
cials in Support of Respondent at 17, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (No.
12-126) (noting one of the obstacles for a wrongfully convicted innocent prisoner is the
need too "carefully go through boxes and boxes of the State's files and records, including
transcripts of the proceedings against him").
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murder." Her affidavit explained how "a man matching Jones's de-
scription entered the shop and asked her whether bloodstains could
be removed from the pants and a shirt he brought in. The pants
were orange, she recalled, and heavily stained with blood, as was the
multicolored shirt left for cleaning along with the pants."3 8 Armed
with this third affidavit, Perkins sought new legal counsel to represent
him in federal court after finishing his post-conviction process years
prior. However, he still faced hurdles preventing him from promptly
filing his newly discovered evidence. During a prison riot, Perkins
lost a part of his court record necessary for his federal appeal. The
remaining records were lost when the prison flooded."' Once he was
able to get copies of these records, he solicited several innocence pro-
jects for assistance but received no assistance." Facing the reality of
representing himself again, Perkins prepared and filed his petition
eleven years after his direct appeal conviction became final.
B. The Supreme Court's Discussion About Perkins and His Innocence Claim
The crux of Perkins' difficulty in satisfying the federal innocence
standard is presenting the factual proof when the petition is filed.
Schlup v. Delo established the federal legal standard for a gateway
claim of actual innocence.42 Newly discovered evidence not consid-
ered by a jury must be presented along with a constitutional violation
in order to trigger the innocence gateway. The gateway then allows
any procedural problems to be waived and permits federal courts to
review the constitutional claim on the merits. What qualifies as new-
ly discovered evidence is "exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not pre-
sented at trial."" At the time a defendant files his petition for writ of
habeas corpus, all evidence fitting within these categories must be
submitted to the district court. Petitioners are expected to file their
evidence supporting not only why they are innocent, but must also
establish the requisite constitutional violation as well. While a form
37 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9.
38 Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1930.
39 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id.
42 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
43 Id. at 316; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (holding that the innocence
gateway will allow a procedural finding of innocence where factual evidence of actual in-
nocence is used to remove any procedural defects in an inmate's habeas petition so long
as he supplements this evidence with a viable constitutional claim).
44 House, 547 U.S. at 537.
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may be used as a guide for the inmate, without the additional validat-
ing documentation, the inmate often faces a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment from the state. Alleged constitutional
claims must also be pled with specificity. While there may be an op-
portunity through federal discovery to broaden the scope of the evi-
dence, a defendant must first establish very credible grounds that his
claim is viable and demonstrates innocence.45 Without that showing,
a defendant will likely never have the opportunity to further the fac-
tual development of his claims.
A consistent thread in the evaluation of new evidence of actual
innocence is a court's assessment of the timing of such evidence." As
established by both Schlup and House, the Court will consider the tim-
ing of the inmate's gateway claim petition. A federal court's evalua-
tion looks at the time between when the inmate's conviction was fi-
nalized in state court, either on direct appeal or post-conviction,
compared to the time it took to present the factual support to a
court.47 For example, in Herrera v. Collins, the Court assessed whether
Leonel Herrera was factually innocent, but the opinion also high-
lighted the difficulties of potentially retrying him ten years after his
initial conviction. Without ample proof of what led to the delay be-
tween conviction and the location of evidence of factual innocence,
the likelihood of success is slim.
The other difficulty with the gateway innocence standard is the
burden of proof the inmate must satisfy. The Court found in Schlup
and reaffirmed in House v. Bell that a petitioner must demonstrate, "it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would not have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."4  It reiterates
that the pool of inmates able to satisfy the exacting standard will be
small.5 0 Federal courts have held fast to this principle, although the
steady rise of exonerations since Schlup has cast doubt as to how small
the pool actually is.5 ' Even where an inmate is successful in establish-
45 RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS R. 6
(2012), www.uscourts.gov/file/rules-governing-section-2254-and-section-2255-
proceedings.
46 House, 547 U.S. at 537 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332) ("[The court] rather may 'con-
sider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on
the probable reliability of that evidence."').
47 Id.
48 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403-04 (1993) (holding that a free-standing claim of
actual innocence is insufficient to grant federal habeas corpus relief).
49 House, 547 U.S. at 537.
50 Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
51 As of April 4, 2016, there have been 1769 exonerations in this country according to the
National Registry of Exonerations. NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
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ing the innocence gateway, the constitutional claim required must al-
so be viable. The inmate's habeas petition must provide the factual
support for each element of that constitutional claim in their federal
habeas corpus petition.
After Perkins filed his pro se petition, the federal district court
dismissed it for his failure to comport with the statute of limitations
and his lack of diligence in pursuing evidence of innocence." Per-
kins appealed the denial to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, asking
it to consider whether the one year statute of limitations, when
missed, necessitated a due diligence requirement prior to a finding of
actual innocence." The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court
based on its precedent established in Souter v. Jones. Souter held that
an untimely inmate's claim may still pass through the actual inno-
cence gateway beyond the 2244(d) statute of limitations on equitable
tolling grounds.4 According to the Sixth Circuit, diligence, with re-
spect to promptly filing newly discovered evidence of innocence, is
55not a prerequisite to a finding of innocence. Because habeas corpus
is an equity action seeking to protect against miscarriages of justice,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 11,
2016). Further, researchers suggest the rate of wrongful convictions in this country is 2-
5% percent of the current prison population. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Con-
victed: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007); Samuel Gross, et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defend-
ants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. So. U.S.A. 7230, 7233 (2014). But
see Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incident of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L.
BULL. 221, 226, 230 (2012) (suggesting the rate of wrongful convictions is between .005%
to .01% of all felony convictions).
52 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 11.
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limita-
tion period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct re-
view or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State ac-
tion in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) (1).
53 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 12.
54 395 F.3d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 2005).
55 Id. at 600, 601 n.4. For other circuit court decisions finding untimely gateway innocence
petitions may be heard, see Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 552 (2d Cir. 2012); Lee v.
Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Sandoval v. Jones, 447 F. App'x 1,
4-5 (10th Cir. 2011); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2011) (dic-
tum); Riva v. Ficco, 615 F.3d 35, 44 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010).
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requiring a preliminary finding of due diligence would undermine
the otherwise-viable claims of innocent people.56 The Sixth Circuit's
ruling took into account the difficulties facing the wrongfully con-
victed as they seek the evidence necessary to present a prima facie
case of actual innocence. When Perkins' case reached the Supreme
Court, the briefing and oral argument centered on the perceived
laxness by Perkins after his state conviction until he filed his habeas
corpus petition.
During the Perkins oral argument, several members of the Court
struggled with how diligence, within a recognized miscarriage of jus-
tice exception, should apply. One facet of the argument focused on
the possibility that an inmate with a colorable claim might intention-
ally sit on evidence of innocence until a more favorable time to file.
However, Perkins explained that the difficulties pro se inmates face
in satisfying the high burden of proof makes diligence an illusory
concern. While it is improbable that inmates would sit on evidence,
the Court's opinion required federal courts to consider the delay in
ascertaining whether an inmate is innocent." The frequency of such
an occurrence happening is small because of the desire of a wrong-
fully convicted inmate to seek his freedom from prison. To argue
that an innocent inmate would wait years, languishing in prison,
while witnesses who may provide concrete proof of that inmate's fac-
tual innocence die, is beyond the pale." Further, documentary proof
56 Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Brandon Segal, Habeas
Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA's Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway
Standard for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully Convicted Amer-
icans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (2008) (arguing that the shift toward allowing in-
nocent inmates to use equitable tolling principles to prevent manifest injustices has not
achieved its purpose).
57 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 24, 47.
58 Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1935-36 ("Unexplained delay in presenting new evidence bears on
the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing. Perkins so
acknowledges. As we stated in Schlup, '[a] court may consider how the timing of the
submission and the likely credibility of [a petitioner's] affiants bears on the probable reli-
ability of ... evidence [of actual innocence].' Considering a petitioner's diligence, not
discretely, but as part of the assessment whether actual innocence has been convincingly
shown, attends to the State's concern that it will be prejudiced by a prisoner's untoward
delay in proffering new evidence. The State fears that a prisoner might 'lie in wait and
use stale evidence to collaterally attack his conviction . . . when an elderly witness has died
and cannot appear at a hearing to rebut new evidence.' The timing of such a petition,
however, should seriously undermine the credibility of the actual-innocence claim.") (ci-
tations omitted).
59 See Brief for The Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3,
Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (No. 12-126) (describing the obstacles facing inmates as-
serting actual innocence and noting specifically that inmates "have every incentive to seek
habeas relief as expeditiously as possible"); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without
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can be systematically destroyed or physical evidence lost the longer a
case takes to reach litigation. Once convicted, the burden remains
on the inmate to provide hard evidence showing his actual inno-
cence. There is no benefit to waiting. In most cases, time is the en-
emy of the innocent, more so because, with every passing day or week
of delay, it becomes exponentially harder to locate witnesses and evi-
dence.0 The Court's lack of appreciation of this difficulty is strange
given its understanding of the hurdles facing inmates raising fact-
based constitutional claims.
Counsel for the Petitioner, on behalf of the State of Michigan,
and some of the Justices, repeated the notion that filing a habeas pe-
tition based on actual innocence requires little effort even for one
proceeding pro se. As counsel for Petitioner stated:
[B]ut filing the habeas petition itself is not something that takes great
difficulty. Every district court, on their website, has a place where you
click for forms. In the Eastern District of Michigan, when you click that,
the very first two entries are habeas petitions for Federal prisoners and
State prisoners.
And it's a relatively simple form. You check some boxes, say when
your conviction was, and you write your claim. And then every Federal
district court in the country has full-time pro se staff attorneys who go
through these pro se petitions.
And, if there is a legitimate claim there, then the can work that up
for the judge, if necessary, and the State will respond.
Justice Alito continued this idea when questioning Perkins' counsel
about the five-year delay between the end of the state post-conviction
proceeding and the filing of Perkins' initial federal petition. Justice
Alito appeared to be wary of applying leniency to any diligence re-
a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47
ARIz. L. REv. 655, 678 (2005) (noting that rigid time limits to post-conviction review in a
number of states further encourage state prisoners not to delay new evidence claims).
60 See Steven A. Krieger, Why Our justice System Convicts Innocent People, and the Challenges Faced
by Innocence Projects Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 333, 368 (2011) ("The
average project receives approximately sixty-six cases per year that require serious investi-
gation, but it may take longer than a year to complete the investigation for all sixty-six
cases. If additional investigation is necessary, the investigative process will be extremely
case-specific depending on the requestor's claim, but may include: interviewing the re-
questor, searching for new DNA, testing existing DNA, interviewing people involved in
the case (witnesses, experts, family members), obtaining trial transcripts and/or police
reports, investigating the crime scene, and/or meeting with the requestor's prior counsel
and/or prosecutor.") (citations omitted).
61 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 8. But see Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice
of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitu-
tional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1219, 1222-28 (2012)
(discussing the numerous procedural and substantive challenges facing pro se inmates at-
tempting to navigate federal habeas corpus litigation).
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quirement due to the simplicity of the filing process: "You said he
couldn't get a lawyer. He really didn't need a lawyer to do this. He
didn't have access to a library. This isn't a legal issue-isn't a compli-
cated legal issue. It's a factual issue, that anybody who watches detec-
tive shows on TV can understand."" These comments belie the com-
plexity of federal habeas corpus litigation. Further, many inmates do
63
not have Internet access or understand how to work a computer.
Given that prisons are consistently eliminating educational programs
and limiting inmates' library access, filing a federal habeas petition is
not nearly as simple as the Court and the state make it seem." While
forms may be readily available, knowledge of the triggering events
under part of the habeas corpus statutes of limitations, exhaustion,
and defaults is not.6 5 Any misstep in one of these procedural hurdles
of federal habeas may result in a dismissal of a petition, even before a
potential innocence issue comes into play."6 Further, inmates must
plead with specificity and provide factual support for both the evi-
dence establishing a miscarriage ofjustice and the merits of the con-
stitutional claims upon which the writ of habeas corpus must be
granted. It is clear that merely filling out a form does not come
62 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 54.
63 SeeJonathan Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: the Failings and the Future of Prison Law
Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1211-15 (2013) (discussing the difficulties facing inmates
who are computer illiterate as prison libraries institute Westlaw and Lexis computer soft-
ware as their library access).
64 SeeEvan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell BlockD: A Bar Examination to Safeguard Ameri-
ca's jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming Their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 91, 91-92, 112-13 (2006) (noting the widespread defunding and outright
elimination of prison law libraries in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, and New
Mexico, and attributing the losses to the Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996), which denied inmates a constitutional right to access legal research materials).
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) ("A [one]-year period of limitation shall apply to an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus."); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012) ("An application for a writ
of habeas corpus . .. shall not be granted unless .. . (A) the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State."); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
78-79 (1977) (describing the four procedural hurdles that a habeas petitioner must ad-
dress for every claim prior to receiving substantive review of that claim: 1) cognizability
in federal court; 2) deference to state court rulings; 3) exhaustion; and 4) procedural de-
fault).
66 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254; see also 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3.4(b) (6th ed. 2011).
67 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2005) (explaining that a gateway innocence claim
requires that the inmate show both new evidence of innocence and evidence of a consti-
tutional error at trial); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (same). But see Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1993) (finding that a conviction based on a procedural-
ly error-free trial, coupled with the absence of a constitutional claim, was insufficient to
support granting clemency where the action was based solely on a freestanding claim of
innocence).
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close to satisfying all of the procedural or substantive requirements of
federal habeas corpus.
II. FACTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN INNOCENCE CASES
Finding evidence sufficient to provide a colorable claim of actual
innocence takes years and is often a result of blind luck. For inno-
cent, pro se inmates, their ability to get their claims properly before
any court is incredibly daunting given the complexity of state post-
conviction proceedings and federal habeas corpus. The shift in fed-
eral habeas jurisprudence to defer more to the rulings of state courts
makes it even more important that no procedural missteps occur if
inmates hope for substantive review of their evidence.68 Expecting
inmates, especially those asserting innocence, to navigate the collat-
eral appeals process while avoiding procedural difficulties ignores the
reality of the evidentiary requirement necessary for any successful re-
view.
In non-capital cases, wrongfully convicted inmates have two pri-
mary options in developing evidence to support their innocence."
First, they can request aid from an innocence project or similar or-
ganization to both investigate their claims and represent them. In-
nocence projects are located in several states and are now a growing
presence internationally. Innocence organizations differ as to the
scope of cases they accept. This creates numerous complications due
to the sheer volume of requests for assistance and the limited funding
68 See Harringon v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 781 (2011) (reversing the Ninth Circuit, which
had granted federal habeas relief to a state prisoner, on the grounds that the court
"fail[ed] to accord required deference to the decision of a state court"); Cullen v.
Pinholster, 131 S. CL 1388, 1398-1400 (2011) (reaffirming that state courts are the prop-
er forum to fully develop and litigate constitutional claims and that state court decisions
are entitled to deferential review by federal courts); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)-
(2).
69 Individuals charged with capital offenses are usually guaranteed defense counsel
throughout their appeals. Because of the understanding that "death is different," those
facing the death penalty have access to more resources and oversight. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he penalty of death is different in kind
from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."). See generally
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (holding that capital defendants are entitled
to preappliction counsel to assist in filing their federal habeas corpus petitions). See also
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012) (governing the appointment and substitution of counsel in
federal non-capital cases).
Additionally, the exonerations of those on death row demonstrates the extensive
breakdown in the criminal justice system involving wrongful convictions. As of October
12, 2015, there have been 156 exonerations of those on death row. See DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2016),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
1144 [Vol. 18:4
Apr. 2016] UNDERSTANDING INVESTIGATIONS IN HABEAS CORPUS
and staffing of innocence projects. Second, as Perkins did, the
wrongfully convicted inmate may gather the evidence and proceed
through state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus processes
pro se. For those in states without innocence projects, this is the only
way to develop new evidence and figure out how to litigate claims
through the complex maze of collateral appeals. Given the reality of
these factual and legal complexities, the federal courts must apply
flexibility as inmates explain delays in pursing their innocence claims.
A. The Limitations of the Innocence Projects
Innocence projects focus their efforts primarily on investigating
and litigating claims of factual innocence once their clients have
completed their direct appeals.'o Many of these organizations belong
to the Innocence Network. Members of the Innocence Network,
while distinct in the types of cases they accept, have the same mission,
representing those who are wrongfully convicted as they seek to es-
tablish their actual innocence." For many of the member organiza-
tions within the Innocence Network, the most daunting task is pro-
curing facts to satisfy either the state or federal requirements for ac-
actual innocence. Whether it be obtaining evidence for DNA testing
or locating witnesses never interviewed by law enforcement, the ef-
forts necessary to fully investigate a case require a great many re-
sources." Beyond that, the time involved often spans far beyond the
one year statute of limitations provided under the federal habeas
corpus statute.
According to the National Registry of Exonerations, of the 1769
exonerations, the majority were non-DNA cases, where factual inves-
70 Some innocence projects, like The Innocence Project, accept cases where only DNA es-
tablishes actual innocence. Some projects require an inmate having served a certain
amount of time on their sentence to apply while others specialize in cases such as shaken
baby syndrome or arson. See INNOCENCE NETWORK, Innocence Network Member Organiza-
tions, http://innocencenetwork.org/members/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (showing the
case acceptance requirements when a specific organization is selected).
71 About the Network, INNOCENCE NETWORK (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://innocencenetwork.org/about; see also Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Legal Education
in the Age of Innocence: Integrating Wrongful Conviction Advocacy into the Legal Writing Curricu-
lun, 22 B.U. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 129, 134 (2013) (describing the Innocence Network and
the work of innocence projects).
72 See Brief for The Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra
note 59, at 17-19 (describing the time-consuming and difficult investigations required to
support a claim of innocence in pursuit of habeas relief).
73 See id. ("Innocence investigations rarely follow a linear path and are often marked by false
starts, dead ends, and serendipitous "breaks" in the case that lead to exonerating evi-
dence, sometimes many years after conviction."); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012).
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tigation from the ground up was necessary.1 Such factual investiga-
tion involves a detailed review of every aspect of the case-starting
with the crime itself, through the arrest and prosecution of the de-
fendant-and a determination whether there is newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence.7 5 These investigations involve gathering records
from prior defense counsel, all law enforcement agencies working on
the case, forensic testing bench notes and reports, and relevant court
records. Once as much documentation about a case as can be gath-
ered is assembled, the witness interview process often begins. Locat-
ing people connected with a case, either through police reports or
court records, is not only time consuming, but also often a matter of
trial and error, as people move, change their names, or die. Further,
if any expert analysis, such as DNA testing, eyewitness identification,
or fire analysis, is needed, collecting additional records or locating
physical evidence will be necessary.
Because many innocence projects are affiliated with law schools,
the investigation undertaken by law students in the clinical setting
may slow down the speed at which records are obtained and re-
viewed, investigation is completed, and litigation drafted, given the
significant educational component.7 7 As part of their learning expe-
rience, law students are responsible for determining what records to
collect, facts to develop, and what expert analysis must be done on
the case assigned. Due to the complexities of these cases, students of-
74 Number as of April 11, 2016 Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, THE NATIONAL
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2016); see also SAMUEL R. GROSS &
MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012, REPORT BY THE
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations-us_1989_2012fullreport.pdf (finding
that 63% of exonerees from January 1989 through February 2012 "were cleared without
DNA evidence").
75 See Hartung, supra note 71, at 135-36 ("These non-DNA cases tend to be more complex
and challenging, given that they frequently involve a dearth of irretuable evidence estab-
lishing factual innocence."); Steven A. Krieger, Why Ourjustice System Convicts Innocent Peo-
ple, and the Challenges Faced ly Innocence Projects Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L.
REv. 333, 364-69 (2011) (describing an empirical study of the work of innocence projects
and the challenges of investigating and representing inmates that have been wrongfully
convicted).
76 See Russell Stetler, Post-Conviction Investigation in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Aug. 1999,
at 41-42 (describing the meticulous "paper chase" that must precede interviews of
witnesseses in a post-conviction investigation).
77 See Keith Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Innocence Projects In
Clinical Legal Education 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 231, 231-32 (2006) (describing the growing
presence of innocence projects in law school settings); see generally Hartung, supra note
71, at 141 (discussing different perspectives on the appropriate amount of responsibility
to give to law students involved with innocence projects).
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ten work in teams, breaking down the numerous assignments into
much more manageable tasks.7 " All of this is done under the supervi-
sion of the clinical professor and staff attorneys who assist the stu-
dents.
While the law students gain crucial practical skills in how to devel-
op actual cases, these cases take longer to proceed because the stu-
dents must be allowed to learn as they go." Students often make mis-
takes and must research how to find court records or locate witnesses
where an experienced attorney would quickly handle such tasks.
Having an innocence clinic within a law school environment is not
only good for the students, but also permits the very expensive factual
investigation to occur for a fraction of the actual cost." Because this
area of law does not generate money for attorneys, there is very little
impetus for lawyers to take these cases outside of pro bono efforts of
larger law firms who can defray litigation costs.8 ' The trade-off for
clinics is the slower factual development and, likely, the filing of a vi-
able case outside the federal one year statute of limitations.
Along with relying on student assistance, there are the additional
problems of funding and staffing to assist these students. As men-
tioned, many innocence projects are affiliated with law schools or
non-profits working within other state agencies or universities. As
such, much of their funding comes from grants, private donations,
82and other similar funding sources. While many law schools may
cover the clinical professor position, they often do not cover the ex-
penses such as: staff attorneys; paralegals; investigators, or other con-
tract workers, like experts that are often required to handle the vol-
ume of cases that are necessary; court records; law enforcement
records; and forensic reports. Therefore, without consistent outside
revenue, key positions are lost or never funded to begin with and
78 See Hartung, supra note 71, at 137-38 (describing the collaborative nature of most inno-
cence work in the law school setting).
79 See Findley, supra note 77, at 265-66 (discussing the trade-off of giving students greater
responsibilities in innocence cases at the risk of delays or errors); see also Rose
Ricciardelli, et al., "Now I see it for What it Really is": The Impact of Participation in an Inno-
cence Project Practicum on Griminology Students, 75 ALB. L. REv. 1439, 1450-56 (2012) (de-
scribing results of a study of criminology students experiences reviewing claims of wrong-
ful conviction for an innocence project).
80 Krieger, supra note 60, at 371-72 (discussing in detail the finances and budgetary con-
straints of innocence projects).
81 See id. at 372 n.234 (explaining that the average cost of an exoneration is $333,239). Non-
DNA cases are likely to be higher given the amount of investigation and expert assistance
needed to satisfy the high evidentiary standards. Id.
82 See id. at 383-84 (describing the difficulties in fundraising for project needs).
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overall case productivity declines.13 Often this combination of fund-
ing deficiencies and educational focus contributes to the slower fac-
tual development of many innocence cases.
Currently, there are fifty-five innocence organizations in the Unit-
84ed States, but this does not equate to a project in every state. Some
states have several projects handling different types of innocence cas-
es. For instance, some innocence organizations handle only DNA
cases, represent only female inmates, or handle only first degree
85murder cases. These limitations mean a dearth of qualified legal as-
sistance for inmates seeking help in building their innocent cases for
collateral and federal proceedings. Often they seek the assistance of
any and every project with the hope of obtaining representation. As
their options are slim to begin with, these inmates are often forced
into representing themselves because they are unable to obtain rep-
resentation.
B. Case Delays in Innocence Cases
Based on the work of innocence projects and attorneys, over a
thousand inmates have been exonerated. The majority of these ex-
onerations are non-DNA cases where inmates must navigate state
post-conviction and federal habeas in order to show actual inno-
cence. In these situations, inmates struggle to satisfy the high burden
of proof and in many aspects are unable to do so due to procedural
pitfalls of habeas jurisprudence. Federal courts continue to be frus-
trated with the seeming "delay" in bringing these cases within a one-
year window promptly as anticipated under the AEDPA." Even when
they acknowledge the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, the fed-
eral courts struggle with the procedural hurdles from state collateral
proceedings as they evaluate constitutional claims.
As illustrated below, the cases of Darryl Burton, exonerated in
2008; Larry Pat Souter, exonerated in 2005; and Paul House, exoner-
ated in 2009, demonstrate the challenges for both non-capital and
83 See id. (noting that the lack of full-time positions leads to an over reliance on less skilled
voluneers).
84 See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members (last visited
Feb. 16, 2016) (listing all the member innocence organizations, their location, and types
of cases accepted).
85 See, e.g., Innocence Network Member Organizations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); Women's Project, CENTER FOR
WRONGFUL CONVicTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongful
convictions/womensproject/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); CENTURION MINISTRIES,
http://www.centurionministries.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
86 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012).
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capital defendants in establishing their factual innocence within the
strict confines of federal habeas corpus review."' The deficiencies of
their trial and direct appeal attorneys of each of these men impaired
their ability to properly achieve substantive review in federal habeas
proceedings. Finding evidence establishing their innocence often
came piecemeal making it harder for an inmate to fully articulate the
reasons for his wrongful conviction. Specifically, if their Sixth
Amendment counsel failed to provide adequate factual investigation
of their cases pretrial or shortly after conviction, it negatively impact-
ed on their ability to have substantive review in later proceedings.
Therefore, some were successful in federal court, while others felt
first-hand the current limits of the writ of habeas corpus in protecting
the wrongfully convicted.
1. Darryl Burton: Exonerated from Missouri After Twenty-Four Years
Darryl Burton faced capital murder charges in the shooting death
of Donald Ball at a gas station in 1984." The state's case against Dar-
ryl rested primarily on two eyewitnesses: Claudex Simmons and Ed-
die Walker, Jr., who testified they saw him shoot Mr. Ball as he ran
away across the gas station parking lot."9 During the trial, the two
eyewitnesses provided wildly inconsistent accounts of where they
were, where they saw the shooter run afterwards, and what the shoot-
er looked like." Despite these inconsistencies, the jury convicted
Darryl, sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for fifty years plus another twenty-five years for armed criminal
action.9'
Five months after Darryl's conviction, one of the eyewitnesses,
Claudex Simmons, recanted his testimony: "I submitted perjury tes-
timony [sic] to gain immunity from the herein-mentioned murder of
one Donald Ball." 2 However, this recantation was not enough to
overturn Darryl's conviction on either direct appeal or in state post-
87 See Stephanie Denzel, Darryl Burton, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Before June
2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3076;
Stephanie Denzel, Larry Pat Souter, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Before June
2012),
https://www.1aw.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3656;
Paul Gregory House, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Before June 2012),
https://www.Iaw.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3307.
88 Darryl Burton, supra note 87.
89 Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2002).
90 See Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312, at 7-13 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008).
91 Id. at 1.
92 Burton, 295 F.3d at 843.
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conviction review." Darryl filed a pro se federal habeas corpus peti-
tion raising sixteen grounds for relief.9 4 However, much of the factu-
al evidence supporting his innocence claim was found after he re-
ceived the aid of Centurion Ministries.99 They began investigating
Darryl's case in 2000 and found significant evidence establishing his
factual innocence but their assistance came after his pro se petition
was filed." Pro bono counsel working alongside Centurion Ministries
began representing Darryl, entering an appearance to assist him in
his federal habeas litigation.
After Simmons' recantation, investigators found additional evi-
dence refuting the state's case against Darryl. Namely, Simmons, one
of the prosecution's eyewitnesses received benefits not disclosed to
Darryl's defense counsel prior to trial.98 Additional witnesses provid-
ed affidavits and deposition testimony that Walker, the other eyewit-
ness, was not present at the scene, has a history of untruthfulness,
and a history of vision problems all calling into question his identifi-
cation.9
93 See Burton v. State, 817 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding trial court's de-
nial of Burton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Burton, 710 S.W.2d
306, 308-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming Burton's conviction on direct appeal). Dar-
ryl's post-conviction counsel did not raise an innocence claim in his motion, nor did the
attorney conduct any substantive investigation to provide factual support for the constitu-
tional claims raised. Missouri does provide post-conviction counsel to inmates, but this
counsel falls outside the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
94 Burton v. Dormire, No. 4:97-cv-00645, at 2-3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2001) (Memorandum
and Order) [hereinafter Burton, Memorandum]. Darryl's habeas corpus petition was
timely, given that he filed it within the one-year statute of limitations from when the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act went into effect
95 CENTURION MINISTRIES, supra note 85. Centurion Ministries is an organization that inves-
tigates cases of wrongful convictions. When a case is found, they contract with local
counsel or law firms to represent the inmate in state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus proceedings.
96 Darryl Burton, CENTURION MINISTRIES, htp://www.centurionministries.org/cases/darryl-
burton/index.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). Presenting new evidence during the federal
habeas state is problematic because the constitutional claims arising from this new evi-
dence are more susceptible to exhaustion and procedural default challenges by the At-
torney General or sua sponte by the federal court.
97 Appearance for Petitioner Darryl Burton, Burton v. Dormire, No. 4:97-cv-00645 (E.D. Mo.
filed Apr. 4, 2000).
98 See Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312, at 2, 20-39 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008)
("[T]he failure of the State to disclose Mr. Simmons' full criminal history was so prejudi-
cial that it violated Mr. Burton's right to due process under the Brady doctrine."); see also
Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding Burton's trial was not
"rendered fundamentally unfair by the state's non-disclosure" and holding "Burton suf-
fered no prejudice on account of the prosecutors' conduct").
99 Burton v. Dormire, No. 4:97-cv-00645, at 15 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2001) (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law andJudgment) [hereinafter Burton,Judgment].
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Counsel for Darryl argued that the actual innocence gateway rec-
ognized in Schlup v. Delo provides a legal means to excuse any proce-
dural defaults which would prohibit a federal court from reaching
the merits of his constitutional claims.'" So long as Darryl presented
facts supporting his innocence such that no reasonable juror would
convict, that would allow the federal court to examine his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim on the merits.'1 Further, Darryl's
counsel argued that he had provided factual support for his constitu-
tional claims and sought an evidentiary hearing to fully present his
case of actual innocence. o2 The federal district court denied his
claim for relief finding that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
was procedurally barred or exhausted.'03 His request for an eviden-
tiary hearing was denied, but the court certified four claims for review
to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.10 4
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of relief
but not before recognizing that Darryl was very likely innocent:
The present case suggests we may not yet have achieved the optimal
balance. Darryl Burton's habeas petition depicts a troubling scenario.
One cannot read the record in this case without developing a nagging
suspicion that the wrong man may have been convicted of capital murder
and armed criminal action in a Missouri courtroom. Burton was convict-
ed on the strength of two eyewitness accounts. Since his trial and impris-
onment, new evidence has come to light that shakes the limbs of the
prosecution's case. One eyewitness has recanted and admitted perjury.
The other eyewitness's veracity has been questioned by a compatriot who
avers it was physically impossible for him to have seen the crime. A lay-
person would have little trouble concluding Burton should be permitted
to present his evidence of innocence in some forum. Unfortunately, Bur-
ton's claims and evidence run headlong into the thicket of impediments
erected by courts and by Congress. Burton's legal claims permit him no
relief, even as the facts suggest he may well be innocent. Mindful of our
obligation to apply the law, but with no small degree of reluctance, we
deny Burton a writ.
Burton's habeas petition troubles us because his legal claims do not
provide him an adequate foundation upon which to present his consid-
erable claims of factual innocence. Though our jurisprudence offers
Burton no relief, we express the hope that the state of Missouri may pro-
100 Burton, Memorandum, No. 4:97-cv-00645, at 4.
101 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (explaining the factual burden that an in-
mate must meet for his evidence of actual innocence; specifically, no reasonable juror
would have convicted the defendant had they known this evidence at the time of trial).
102 Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2002).
103 Burton v. Dormire, No.4:97-cv-00645, at 14-16 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2000).
104 Burton, 295 F.3d at 844.
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vide a forum (either judicial or executive) in which to consider the
mounting evidence that Burton's conviction was procured by perjured or
flawed eyewitness testimony. In the final analysis, Burton may well be
guilty, but the new evidence he has unearthed suggests his case at least
deserves a second look.0 5
The district court and Eighth Circuit's inability to provide a meaning-
ful way to litigate actual innocence, given a colorable claim, is trou-
blesome for two reasons. First, because Darryl's counsel-at trial, di-
rect appeal, and post-conviction review-failed to conduct a full fac-
factual investigation into his constitutional claims, Darryl was unable
to obtain full federal habeas review.'06 The constraints applied by the
AEDPA limited the federal court's ability to address his newly discov-
ered evidence of innocence.o7
Second, because the safety-valve measure that the innocence
gateway is supposed to create did not protect Darryl's rights. The
Eighth Circuit's analysis under Schlup, while acknowledging the
strength of the newly discovered evidence indicating innocence,
failed to credit the evidence uncovered as satisfying the constitutional
claims raised. The limitations of the AEDPA handcuff the federal
court's ability to properly assess innocence evidence. The difficulties
of finding such evidence so long after the crime and of navigating
through the mire of state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus
only demonstrate the disconnect between the legal remedy and an
inmate's ability to access it. For Darryl, it was only after he returned
to state habeas proceedings, an option not available in many states,
that he finally obtained an innocence finding on the very constitu-
tional claim the federal courts believed meritless."'o
2. Larry Souter: Exonerated from Michigan After Thirteen Years
The police did not immediately arrest Souter for the death of
Kristy Ringler when she was found dead in the middle of the road in
105 Id. at 842, 849.
106 Interestingly, Mr. Burton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims would likely give him a
ground for relief, whereas his gateway innocence claim under Schlup would and did not.
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1) (2012) (directing federal courts to defer to factual determina-
tions by state courts through a presumption of correctness and permitting a habeas peti-
tioner to rebut the presumption only "by clear and convincing evidence").
108 Compare Burton, 295 F.3d at 847 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding Burton's trial was "not ren-
dered fundamentally unfair by the state's non-disclosure of an alleged second plea
agreement" and "Burton suffered no prejudice on account of the prosecutors' conduct"),
with Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CCO0312, at 1, 42 (Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008)
(holding "[t]he failure to disclose ... critical impeachment information was highly prej-
udicial" and "rendered Mr. Burton's trial fundamentally unfair").
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1979.'09 Instead, the newly elected sheriff arrested Souter twelve years
later, after publicly stating he would resolve unsolved cases.o Souter
and Ringler met at a bar and later that same night followed a group
to a friend's party."' Later in the evening, Ringler decided to walk
home even though Souter attempted to talk her Out of it." 2 Several
people at the party mentioned Ringler had been drinking when she
left the party."' She was found later that night dead in the middle of
the road with lacerations on her head.H4 The police searched the
scene and found a broken brown bottle with type A blood consistent
with the blood types of both Souter and Ringler."" Souter told police
the bottle belonged to him but it was not used against Ringler."' The
neuropathologist who performed the autopsy theorized that the
cause of death could have been either a car accident or a homicide."7
Based on the police investigation and the medical examiner's autopsy
report, the prosecutor chose not to bring charges in Ringler's death
resulting in the case being closed."'
Four years later, at the urging of a police detective working on the
case, a different medical examiner reviewed the autopsy and issued a
report concluding, "the victim's wounds 'may well have been inflict-
ed' by a whiskey bottle.""'9 After the sheriff arrested Souter in 1991,
the prosecutor sought charges against him for Ringer's death.20 The
prosecution's case was extremely weak, relying on circumstantial evi-
dence of the glass found at the scene, the medical examiners' re-
ports, and the testimony of a forensic pathologist who reviewed the
autopsy report. 12 Souter was convicted of second degree murder and
sentenced to twenty to sixty years imprisonment.2 2
109 Souter v.Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2005).
110 See id. ("No further investigation was done on the Ringler case until 1991, when a newly-
elected sheriff, who committed his office to reviewing unsolved homicides, revived the ef-
fort to solve the case."); Report and Recommendation at 2, Souter v. Jones, No. 02-CV-
00067 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2003) ("[Souter] was prosecuted in 1991 'with essentially the
same evidence that was available in 1983.'").
I]] Souler, 395 F.3d at 581.
112 Id.
113 Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4 & n.14, Souter, 395 F.3d 577
(2002) (No. 1:02-cv-00067).
114 Souter, 395 F.3d at 581.
115 Id. at 582.
116 Id. at 581.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 582.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 582-83.
121 Id. at 583; see abo Larry Pat Souter, supra note 87 (noting the defense offered several wit-
nesses that supported Souter's story, including the original forensic pathologist consulted
1153
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Souter pursued relief on direct appeal and state post-conviction
review with no success."' After a lengthy investigation which took
more than the one year statute of limitations for federal habeas cor-
pus, Souter found sufficient evidence of actual innocence.124 The fac-
tual investigation done by Souter's counsel uncovered affidavits from
the original medical examiner and the forensic pathologist recanting
their testimony from Souter's trial and refuting the state's key pa-
thology testimony." Further, Souter presented an affidavit from a
private investigator who interviewed the bottle manufacturer explain-
ing that their glass was not constructed to have sharp edges.1 2 6 There-
fore, it was impossible for the broken bottle to cause the wounds on
the victim's head and face. Lastly, photographs from the crime scene
of the victim's clothes covered in blood supported the initial pathol-
ogy finding that she was struck by a car.m
The federal district court granted the State of Michigan's motion
for summary judgment because Souter's petition was filed beyond the
statute of limitations. Souter appealed his denial to the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that newly discovered evidence
of actual innocence is legally sufficient to trump the AEDPA one-year
statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit found he presented ample
evidence of actual innocence to equitably toll the federal statute of
limitations: 130
Absent evidence of Congress's contrary intent, there is no articulable rea-
son for treating habeas claims barred by the federal statute of limitations
by police in 1979 who stated he believed Ringler was hit by a car and at least four witness-
es in attendance at the party who either confirmed Souter's recollection or testisfied that
he was not acting abnormally).
122 Souter, 395 F.3d at 583.
123 Id. His claims focused on the twelve year gap between the victim's death and Souter's
arrest; however, the state courts found he was not prejudiced by the prosecution's delay.
Id.
124 See Souter, 395 F.3d at 597 ("In light of the new evidence-the recanted testimony of Dr.
Bauserman, the changed opinion of Dr. Cohle, the shape of the molds used in the manu-
facturing process, Hiram Walker's history of distributing the bottle without incident, the
photos of the bloody clothes-we find that 'it surely cannot be said that ajuror, conscien-
tiously following the judge's instructions requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
would vote to convict.'"); see also Brief for The Innocence Network As Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, supra note 59, at 16 (describing Souter's new evidence and not-
ing that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's order hold-
ing Souter's habeas petition untimely).
125 Souter, 395 F.3d at 583-84.
126 Id. at 583.
127 Id. at 584.
128 Id. at 580.
129 Id. at 584-85.
130 Id. at 596.
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differently. Similar to our holding in the equitable tolling context, we
conclude that against the backdrop of the existing jurisprudence and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, Congress enacted this new pro-
cedural limitation consistent with the Schlup actual innocence excep-
to. 131tron.
The Sixth Circuit's key point of discussion in Souter is the importance
of federal habeas as an equity right specifically designed to provide
relief in these contexts.'32 When the Supreme Court recognized equi-
table tolling as a means to excuse an untimely habeas petition, the
Court emphasized the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus as an equitable
remedy specifically designed to alleviate such injustices. "3 The entire
point of the Writ is to ensure the innocent a mechanism to gain relief
when all other legal avenues fail. Upon remand to the district court,
Souter's habeas petition was granted. The prosecution conceded all
points raised in Souter's petition specifically agreeing that the twelve
year delay actually prejudiced him.3 4
3. Paul Gregory House: Exonerated After Twenty-Two Years from
Tennessee
Paul House faced capital murder charges for the death of Carolyn
Muncey in 1985.3' According to the state, the victim was raped and
beaten near her home in rural Tennessee.' The state's case against
House contained no direct evidence implicating him in Muncey's
death. The prosecution relied on the fact that the blood found on
House's clothes along with semen found on the victim's clothing was
consistent with House's blood type, and on the testimony of two wit-
nesses that they saw House near the location where the vicitm's body
131 Id. at 599.
132 Id. at 597-98.
133 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-49 (2010) ("The importance of the Great Writ, the
only writ explicitly protected by the Constitution, Art. I, §9, cl. 2, along with congressional
efforts to harmonize the new statute with prior law, counsels hesitancy before interpret-
ing AEDPA's statutory silence as indicating a congressional intent to close courthouse
doors that a strong equitable claim would ordinarily keep open.").
134 See Report and Recommendation, supra note 110, at 3 ("The court noted that the
Newaygo County prosecutor 'appears to have conceded in closing argument that the state
was negligent in not pursuing the charges at least between 1983 and 1991.'"). Much of
Souter's success rested upon his representation throughout the federal habeas process.
Even though his petition was filed beyond the statute of limitations, his counsel was
versed enough in the process to meet the procedural and substantive issues raised by the
respondent.
135 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 521 (2006); see also Paul G. House, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail
.aspx?caseid=3307 (describing details of the crime and House's arrest).
136 Id. See also House, 547 U.S. 518, 522, 526, 532-33.
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was found.'7 The jury convicted House, sentencing him to death.
Similar to Darryl Burton, whose direct appeal and state post-
conviction counsel failed to properly investigate and litigate both the
facts and the constitutional violations supporting his innocence,
House was denied relief in state court.3 9
House filed a second post-conviction pleading requesting investi-
gative services to substantiate his actual innocence and ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim.'" The state courts denied his post-
conviction petition on the grounds that his claims were procedurally
barred because he should have asserted them in his initial post-
conviction pleadings.41 House then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus asserting his actual innocence as a means to bypass the proce-
dural bars prohibiting a substantive review of his claims.142 The dis-
trict court granted the state's request for summary judgment on a ma-
jority of his constitutional claims based on procedural bars from state
court.14 3 However, the district court did allow an evidentiary hearing
to ascertain whether Schlup innocence gateway would remove state
procedural obstacles.'"
Evidence establishing House's factual innocence rested on con-
tamination of physical evidence, impermissibly withheld witness
statements taken by the police, and new witness accounts incriminat-
ing the victim's husband.145 Further, new DNA testing on the rape kit
taken from the victim proved House had no sexual contact with the
victim.' The Supreme Court found House's presentation of newly
discovered evidence of actual innocence sufficient to waive the pro-
cedural bars preventing federal courts from reviewing his constitu-
tional claims on the merits.'47 In demonstrating his actual innocence
in federal court, not only did House have competent habeas counsel,
but also he finally obtained the resources required for factual devel-
opment-the resources that he could not obtain in state post-
conviction proceedings.'48 Between his state post-conviction and fed-
137 Paul G. House, supra note 135.
138 House, 547 U.S. at 521.
139 Id. at 533-34.
140 Id. at 534.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 540.
147 Id. at 537, 555.
148 See Paul G. House, supra note 135 (describing House's factual investigation post-
conviction).
1156 [Vol. 18:4
Apr. 2016] UNDERSTANDING INVESTIGATIONS IN HABEAS CORPUS
eral habeas proceedings, it took House over ten years for the factual
development of innocence.1 4 9 Given the structural barriers created by
incompetent trial and appellate counsel, it is hard to imagine
House's ten year struggle to be deemed dilatory.
Deficiencies in the state court process faced by these three men in
gathering the facts supporting innocence made it exceptionally diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to obtain relief in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. The errors attributable to their trial counsels' negligence
in not investigating the crime or avenues for a viable defense led to
omissions of key evidence at trial. Exacerbating the problem was ap-
pellate counsels' failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims with the necessary factual support that the Constitution re-
quires. The Supreme Court seems to recognize the woeful impact of
defense counsel who do not live up to the Sixth Amendment's man-
date. The Court's recent decisions in both Martinez and Trevino pro-
vide an additional safety-value for procedural difficulties when coun-
sel fails to adequately perform.
III. THE EXPANSION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS A
WAIVER OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULTS
As the Supreme Court considered the ramifications of the AEDPA
statute of limitations on inmates asserting actual innocence, it also
dealt with inmates facing complications in state court with viable inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims. The Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel protects a defendant from the time of
charging through the end of direct appeal.15 o Ineffective assistance of
counsel claims must be raised at the first available opportunity either
on direct appeal or state post-conviction proceedings depending on
what a state's statutes provide. Inmates asserting claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel must establish their constitutional claim by prov-
ing that trial or appellate counsel provided deficient performance
and that deficiency prejudiced the defendant."'1 Establishing defi-
cient performance requires an inmate to establish his prior counsel's
actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.1 5' The
Court advised that looking at prevailing norms will assist in determin-
ing whether an attorney's conduct fell below the objective standard of
149 House, 547 U.S. at 533-35.
150 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
151 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
152 Id. at 681.
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reasonableness.5  Those prevailing norms can be the American Bar
Association ("ABA") Rules for Defense Function, Capital Representa-
tion, or state bar requirements.154
Additionally, an inmate must demonstrate actual prejudice due to
the failings of his trial or appellate counsel. This requires an inmate
to prove what was not done that the attorney should have done. For
example, if a defendant asserts his counsel failed to present an alibi
defense, timesheets, or records showing where the defendant was at
the time of the crime must be submitted along with credible witness
affidavits or depositions testifying as to how they know of the defend-
ant's whereabouts and why such evidence was not presented during
his trial. Without such hard proof, the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim fails on the prejudice element.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), post-conviction counsel's incompetence is not a cogniza-
ble claim in federal court.'15 Inmates attempted to excuse any proce-
dural problems in their habeas petitions through the failings of their
counsel in collateral proceedings. However, such actions gained no
traction with the Court until recently. The Supreme Court had con-
sistently held the deficiencies of a defendant's post-conviction coun-
sel were insufficient to establish "cause" under the "cause and preju-
dice" doctrine to dismiss a procedural default once the case reached
federal court.'5  The Court instructed that satisfying "cause" necessi-
tates that a defendant prove an external impediment to himself or his
153 Id. at 688.
154 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION STANDARDS (3d 1993); Am. Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfor-
mance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2003) ("[A]
national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases .. . designed to express exist-
ing 'practice norms and constitutional requirements.'"). For cases citing professional
guidelines to determine whether attorney conduct was reasonable, see, for example,
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (citing ABA guidelines to support holding
that capital defense attorneys have a duty to review evidence prosecution will probably
use in sentencing); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-26 (2003) (finding that the capi-
tal defense attorney's investigation fell short of professional standards to discover all rea-
sonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 592 U.S. 362, 371, 395-96
(2000) (finding that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's back-
ground to discover and present significant mitigating evidence falls below professional
norms for a capital defense attorney).
155 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012).
156 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492
(1986).
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counsel for the failure to properly abide by state court rules either at
trial, direct appeal, or in collateral proceedings.'5
Similar to Perkins, Carrier, in Murray v. Carrier, filed a second pro
se appellate brief raising a prosecutorial misconduct claim when his
direct appeal counsel failed to do So." When his appeal was denied,
Carrier again raised the same claim in post-conviction proceedings
only to have it dismissed by the Virginia courts.5  In reviewing the
state court action, the Supreme Court's holding prevented any con-
sideration of why trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel failed to
properly argue or assert valid constitutional claims as a justification
for excusing the procedural defects from state court.'" Instead, er-
rors of post-conviction counsel are imputed to an inmate on the justi-
fication that "[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state
post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot
claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such pro-
ceedings."6 1  Only in a very narrow set of cases, such as when the
state's actions deprived a defendant of effective assistance of counsel,
might the cause requirement be met for the state procedural bar.'
163
The Court continued to hold this position in subsequent cases.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v.
Ryan, was a 180-degree turn from longstanding jurisprudence. Mar-
tinez argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his
initial, court-appointed, state post-conviction counsel waived any po-
tentially meritorious ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim when
she filed his appeal.6 4 Now armed with new collateral counsel, Mar-
tinez's second state post-conviction appeal asserted, for the first time,
the lack of any investigation by trial counsel and overall failure to
challenge the state's case.'6 The Arizona trial and appellate courts
denied relief on procedural grounds, finding that his ineffective assis-
157 Carner, 477 U.S. at 488. Based on the Court's rationale, official misconduct, like Brady
violations, squarely fit as "cause" external to any actions of a defendant.
158 Id. at 482-83. The waiver doctrine allows state courts to dismiss constitutional violations
not properly raised within state court procedural rules.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 488-89.
161 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations omitted).
162 See id. at 754 (holding that the failure of counsel to timely file a notice of appeal was not
"cause" within "cause and prejudice" to excuse a valid procedural bar; the procedural bar
prevented the federal court from reaching the merits of the inmate's constitutional
claims).
163 Carrier, 477 U.S. 478; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); see generally 1
LIEBMAN AND HERTZ, supra note 66 § 2.5.
164 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313-15 (2012).
165 Id. at 1314.
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tance of trial counsel claim should have been raised on his initial col-
lateral appeal.' The imposition of this procedural bar followed Mar-
tinez through to federal habeas corpus review where the district court
and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the habeas petition on
the same basis.6 1
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, emphasized the
unique nature of ineffective assistance of trial counsel compared with
other constitutional violations raised in state post-conviction proceed-
ings. Because such claims are so fact-intensive, leaving little-to-no
template as to how to properly establish the elements of deficient
performance and prejudice, it justified a narrow exception to the
longstanding precedent set in Murray v. Carner and reaffirmed in
Coleman v. Thompson.' A defendant "needs an effective attorney" to
fully develop a Sixth Amendment claim at the first available oppor-
tunity during post-conviction proceedings.6 9  Full development de-
pends upon fact investigation including records collection and possi-
bly expert analysis of physical evidence in order for the constitutional
claim to be properly litigated. "[W]hile confined to prison, the pris-
oner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, which often turns on evidence out-
side the trial record.",o The Court's appreciation for the difficulties
in locating hard evidence in the form of witness statements, court
files, police reports, and expert testimony serves as justification for in-
sisting that there be effective counsel in collateral proceedings given
that the claim can only be raised during post-conviction. The Court
found that only once an inmate is provided with effective legal repre-
sentation to handle not only complex legal procedures, but also to
procure the evidence necessary to prove both deficient performance
and prejudice will a state be allowed to raise an independent and ad-
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1315.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1317; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS § 4-8.6 (3d 1993) (explaining professional standards that
defense counsel should adhere to in the post-conviction stage, particularly when to advise
a client to pursue or not pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
170 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911,
1921 (2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318) ("[P]ractical considerations, such as the
need for a new lawyer, the need to expand the trial court record, and the need for suffi-
cient time to develop the claim, argue strongly for initial consideration of the claim dur-
ing collateral, rather than on direct review.").
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equate procedural bar to ineffective assistance of counsel of post-
conviction in federal proceedings."'
Trevino v. Thaler extended the cause and prejudice exception
carved out in Martinez to apply to those states whose ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims must be raised on direct appeal to avoid the
later imposition of procedural bars.'" If a state's direct appeal pro-
cess does not provide a sufficient framework for defense counsel to
assess whether there was a viable ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, then an inmate may have cause for excusing a procedurally de-
ficient filing in federal court. Echoing the essential importance of
defense counsel to the criminal justice system, the Court recognized
the difficulties inmates suffered in trying to comply with state direct
appeal rules. Trevino's defense counsel in both direct appeal and
collateral proceedings failed to raise any ineffective assistance of pen-
alty phase counsel claim."'
For those states requiring fact-based claims on direct appeal, there
is usually a short window between a conviction and when the initial
brief on direct appeal is due. Because of the compressed timing
there was insufficient time to fully digest transcripts and pretrial rec-
ords and then ascertain what factual development needed to be
completed prior to filing the initial brief. The Court saw the systemic
limitations on the ability of inmates to fully plead the Sixth Amend-
ment claims under this framework.1 1 4
The trial court appointed new counsel for Trevino eight days after sen-
tencing. Counsel thus had 22 days to decide whether, and on what
grounds, to make a motion for a new trial. She then may have had an
additional 45 days to provide support for the motion but without the help of
a transcript (which did not become available until much later-seven
171 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319-20 (2012) (explaining that failure to meet the
standards of effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction review allows litigants
to bypass procedural bars to federal habeas review).
172 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013).
173 Id. at 1915. In capital cases, a defendant has two separate trial phases: the guilt phase
and the penalty phase. Defense counsel is expected to investigate and thoroughly pre-
pare for both phases of a capital trial. Failure to do so may result in a finding of ineffec-
tive assistance of penalty phase counsel. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005)
(holding that, for the sentencing phase, the capital defense counsel must investigate ma-
terial that the prosecution will probably introduce as evidence of aggravating factors);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-26 (2003) (describing how the defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel was violated at the sentencing phase because the defense
counsel failed to thoroughly conduct an investigation for mitigation evidence).
174 Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918-19. "As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself has pointed
out, 'the inherent nature of most ineffective assistance' of trial counsel 'claims' means
that the trial court record will often fail to 'contai[n] the information necessary to sub-
stantiate' the claim." Id. at 1918.
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months after the trial). It would have been difficult, perhaps impossible,
within that time frame to investigate Trevino's background, determine
whether trial counsel had adequately done so, and then develop evidence
175
about additional mitigating background circumstances.
Such evaluation and investigation is paramount to ascertain whether
an inmate received the constitutionally mandated counsel she de-
served during trial. Therefore, before a state procedural default on
an untimely or deficient ineffective assistance of counsel of trial
counsel claim can be applied in federal habeas, it is incumbent that
both the state's collateral framework and inmate have somewhat
competent counsel to evaluate the trial counsel's performance. Such
attention to the inability of pro se inmates to meet the evidentiary
burden of proof on ineffective assistance of counsel is telling given
that Perkins was not given a similar benefit of the doubt. Also, the
Court's acknowledgement hat states are often haphazard in provid-
ing a collateral framework for inmates or their counsel to have not
only the time, but also the resources to prove their prior counsel was
ineffective due to failure to investigate, provide, or some factual er-
ror, is commendable but does not go far enough.
IV. FACT DEVELOPMENT IS FACT DEVELOPMENT: WHY THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INNOCENCE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL?
The difficulties facing inmates arguing innocence as a gateway for
procedural problems are pretty much the same as those of an inmate
raising ineffective assistance of counsel or official misconduct viola-
tions. In both situations, hard evidence from witnesses, physical evi-
dence, forensic testing, experts, or other sources are required in or-
der to satisfy the requisite actual prejudice standard.1 6 Yet, the
Court's treatment of actual innocence in Schlup/House compared with
Martinez/Trevino ineffective assistance of counsel factual evidence de-
velopment demonstrates a marked difference without a clear reason
why. While a gateway innocence argument is not a constitutional vio-
lation in the way ineffective assistance of counsel or Brady claims are,
the burden of proof-the necessity of arguing supporting facts with
specificity-is strikingly similar. 7 Inmates are expected to present
175 Id. at 1919.
176 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) (describing the types of newly discovered evi-
dence necessary for a gateway innocence claim to remove procedural defects on constitu-
tional claims).
177 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that a claim of actual innocence is
not an independent ground for habeas relief); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
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substantive proof of their innocence while also explaining why that
evidence could not have been properly presented during the course
of their trial or initial appeal."' Similarly, not only must an inmate
explain why his trial counsel failed to properly handle his case, but he
must also demonstrate actual prejudice through exhibits showing
what would have been presented had trial counsel been effective."'9
In both circumstances, the nature of the evidentiary proof is the
same, requiring inmates without counsel, as is the usual course in
both state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus, to provide con-
crete evidence is almost nigh to impossible.
A. What Inmates Actually Face
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of counsel
when ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised but not for the
factually innocent. Such a divide is troubling given that the lack of
competent counsel often leads to wrongful convictions. Burton,
Souter, House, and Perkins were all victimized by their trial and ap-
pellate counsels' failures. Clearly, these attorneys did not investigate
their cases at trial given the evidence establish their innocence shown
years later during their collateral proceedings. For these men navi-
gating the criminal appellate system, they would now receive federal
relief by arguing a Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel rather than
gateway innocence. This reality causes one to wonder why an inmate
would now pursue the Schlup gateway.
Another obstacle facing inmates raising innocence in federal
court is the expectation that these often uneducated and uniformed
inmates comply with the complicated requirements of state post-
conviction and federal habeas corpus procedures, many of which are
counterintuitive.m The reality is many inmates fail to litigate their
claims properly at the first available opportunity or their court-
(requiring prosecutors to disclose evidence if it would be materially favorable to defend-
ant at the guilt or punishment stage of a trial).
178 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995); Segal, supra note 56, at 248.
179 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1317 (2012) (explaining why viable claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
requires investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy).
180 See Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations
Bar on the Filing of Federal Haheas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2129-30 (2002)
("Many inmates are uneducated, mentally impaired, or both. According to the statistics
compiled in 1994 by the BJS, 47% of the adult inmates in the United States had less than
a high school education and only 16% had some college education. For most inmates,
'attempting to read a law book would be akin to attempting to read a book written in a
foreign language.'").
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appointed collateral counsel-who are not held to the Sixth
Amendment's standard-neglect o conduct an even miniscule re-
view of the record or conduct the necessary investigation needed to
protect these inmates' rights. When collateral counsel fails to proper-
ly review the case materials, evaluate the factual areas of deficiency,
conduct the requisite investigation, and then file a fully developed
appeal, there is little to no recourse for an inmate to overcome such
lax representation in later appeals."' In such a system, it is all but a
forgone conclusion that state procedural bars will be applied in fed-
eral habeas corpus review, tying the hands of federal courts in their
ability to substantively review their convictions.
Given these apparent difficulties, why the Court continues to ap-
ply a harsher standard against the factually innocent is mystifying.
What is so perplexing about the Court's holdings in
Schlup/House/Perkins compared with Martinez/Trevino is that the same
problems occur with both groups of inmates. Yet, the Supreme Court
allows state inmates to trump state procedural defects through the
"cause and prejudice" allowing a pathway to substantive review in
federal habeas corpus. However, when factual innocence is asserted,
trumping a federal statute of limitations, it is permitted, but with less
factual-flexibility.8 2 While the Court re-emphasized its commitment
to protecting against miscarriages of justice in Perkins, the innocence
gateway does little to ensure it. Without a greater understanding of
how the wrongfully convicted ended up imprisoned, these people will
not achieve the substantive review they are entitled to under the Con-
stitution.
Further, the Court seems unmoved by the difficulties faced by pro
se inmates diligently trying to comply with the high burden of proof
the innocence gateway mandates. 1 4 Evidence does not arrive in one
clump but often is uncovered piece by piece leaving one to make a
decision of filing early but with incomplete information or waiting
until all evidence is gathered. Such a conundrum forces pro se in-
181 See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 ("The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with
the State's procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal con-
stitutional law. While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the ev-
identiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside
the trial record.").
182 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (explaining how 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is a
non-jurisdictional federal statute of limitations and subject to waiver).
183 See In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
184 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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mates to act immediately hoping to either gather more factual proof
or legal assistance. The idea that an innocent person would wait in
prison based on a conviction they had no part in for a witness to die
shows callousness to the systemic problems that caused the wrongful
convictions and the numerous landmines they must face to properly
correct such travesties ofjustice.
B. Did the System Fail Perkins?
Perkins presented his affidavits showing the state's main witness
was involved in the murder for which Perkins was convicted at the
first available opportunity, in the best way he knew how.185 Despite
the constitutional deficiencies of his counsel, Perkins did so only after
his direct appeal attorney failed to properly raise this evidence in his
appellate brief." The appellate court dismissed both pro se claims
and held those claims procedurally barred.' Through no fault of his
own, he was deprived of an actual review of the merits of his claims.
Perkins was diligent in asserting his rights to the best of his abilities.
Not only did he seek counsel for years and request the assistance of
innocence projects in accepting his case, he tried to gather the neces-
sary documents counsel would need to begin assessing his case.'"
Circumstances beyond his control, a prison riot and the subsequent
destruction of his files, delayed his ability to comply in a timely fash-
ion." Perkins may, in fact, be innocent. However, he never had the
professional assistance needed to fully develop this evidence and
properly navigate it through the state collateral and federal appellate
system. Therefore, he was deemed to have failed to properly protect
his rights and was denied any meaningful review.'8
Perkins may have been better served arguing an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim in federal court rather than using the inno-
cence gateway. Martinez took this route, even asserting in his federal
habeas pleadings that while he was innocent of the charges, he was
not asserting an innocence gateway claim." Had Perkins raised an
185 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1929 (2013).
186 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 6-7.
187 Id. at 8.
188 Id. at 9-10.
189 Id. at 9.
190 Perkins v. McQuiggin, No. 2:08-CV-139, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 125871 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 4,
2013).
191 Petitioner's Objections to Report and Recommendation at 2-4, Martizez v. Schriro, No.
CV 08-00785 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2008). Martinez may have been beyond the permissible one
year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) when he filed his federal habeas pe-
tition.
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his post-conviction counsel
for failing to properly raise his Sixth Amendment ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel claim on the basis of failure to investigate, he
may have had more success in federal court.
V. How SHOULD THE COURT INTERPRET PERKINS?
The right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock prin-
ciple in our justice system. It is deemed as an 'obvious truth' the idea
that 'any person haled [sic] into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.'"
If the right to counsel during trial and direct appeal is a funda-
mental right which will be protected if a state collateral process fails
to provide adequate means to fully protect that right, then that pro-
tection should be doubly so for those wrongfully convicted. Federal
habeas corpus has always been the legal mechanism to protect consti-
tutional rights.' Yet, the actually innocent are treated harshly given
that their prior counsel have also failed to protect their constitutional
rights. As the circuit courts of appeals and district courts look to ap-
ply Perkins, their analysis should seek to ascertain to what extent prior
counsel's failings impacted on the ability of the wrongfully convicted
to locate evidence establishing innocence. Helping the federal courts
grapple with prior counsel's failings requires them to look at four is-
sues.
First, the inmate should articulate the methods taken to obtain ei-
ther counsel or the assistance of an innocence-affiliated organization.
This includes the timing of such requests in the criminal appellate
process. For example, the inmate could provide copies of letters sent
or confirmation of correspondence from various agencies who ex-
plain the timeframe of their substantive review of the inmate's case or
their denial of assistance.' Supplying this documentation would
prove the inmate had exercised due diligence in asserting actual in-
nocence. If the inmate is successful in obtaining representation from
either an innocence project or pro bono firm, through their repre-
sentation, he can better articulate why their specific project or firm
took longer than the one year statute of limitations to present sub-
192 Martinez v. Schriro, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
193 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
194 During my time as Director of two innocence projects, it was standard practice to alert
inmates to the delay in responding to their request and the length of time it would take
before substantive review of their files and subsequent investigation if a case called for it.
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stantive evidence to the district court.1 5 Not infrequently, the investi-
gation itself may surpass one year as witnesses have moved, new wit-
nesses are uncovered, and expert analysis of the crime must be un-
dertaken.'" As the district court evaluates timing in light of Perkins,
its assessment of the new evidence must take into account the efforts
of not only the inmate but those who may assist him in getting the
case properly filed.
Second, the federal court must consider the internal obstacles of
prison life that hinder an inmate's timely filing. Equitable tolling al-
lows inmates to file beyond the statute of limitations when prisons ob-
struct an inmate's ability to comply with the statute."' Recognizing
the institutional limitations that affect an inmate's ability to fully
plead their innocence depends upon facilities prisons control.
Where the prison mail facilities delay communications between in-
mates and the courts or prison unrest affects compliance with legal
requirements, these circumstances should be considered when evalu-
ating diligence. Many prisons have eliminated law libraries or cur-
tailed their offerings for inmates.19 8 Some prisons have gone to a sole
computer based program, like Lexis or Westlaw, to provide legal ma-
terials.'9 While this is seen as progressive, few inmates understand
how to use technology effectively and are able to arrange time to use
it; thus they can be seriously hampered in their ability to properly
grasp the legal machinations of state post-conviction proceedings and
federal habeas corpus.2 " When prisons fail to provide access to legal
materials or have law libraries, it is nigh to impossible for inmates to
know about the interplay of state post-conviction on their federal ha-
beas proceedings, the statute of limitations, or what burden of proof
they must satisfy. Prisoners have no control over the ability to access
195 Given the Supreme Court's continued emphasis on ineffective assistance of counsel as a
means beyond procedural bars, they should consider the delays in obtaining qualified
post-conviction and federal habeas corpus counsel as within their emphasis of protecting
the Sixth Amendment claim against trial counsel.
196 Brief Amicus Curiae For Former and Current Law Enforcement Officials in Support of
Respondent, supra note 36, at 9 ("The passage of time becomes a crucial element of strat-
egy in the context of difficult-to-investigate cases because changes in relationships beween
people, as well as advances in technology, may lead to information which ultimately
permits law enforcement officer to 'crack' the case.").
197 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010).
198 Seamone, supra note 64, at 92.
199 SeeAbel, supra note 63, at 1211-15 (discussing the computerization of prison law libraries,
including the increase in access to subscription search engines like Westlaw and Lex-
isNexis).
200 Id.
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the prison library, whether the prison goes on lockdown, or if they
will be allowed access to their legal materials.
Without recognizing the institutional constraints inmates face,
federal courts ignore hurdles preventing statutory compliance be-
yond an inmate's control. Perkins could do little about the riots
which occurred or the resulting loss of his legal materials.20 ' The Su-
preme Court's failure to consider this institutional hurdle holds in-
mates to an evidentiary burden the innocent cannot meet. Taking
these factors into account would not increase the number of people
who would be able to meet the extraordinarily high burden for gate-
way innocence claims. The actual innocence standard requires an
inmate to show that, more likely than not, no reasonable juror would
have convicted in light of the newly discovered evidence.202 What it
does provide is a mechanism to allow inmates and their legal repre-
sentative to take the time necessary to properly build their claims at
the first available opportunity as Perkins provided.
Third, if the inmate has any learning disabilities, or mental im-
pairments, this should also be a factor in the court's calculus where
diligence is concerned. Courts must come to understand the reality
of those in prison trying to meet the high evidentiary burden of proof
to substantiate their claims. Many prisons today lack not only ade-
quate access, if any access at all, to legal materials but it is questiona-
ble whether the inmates understand the statutes and cases they read.
Studies show a significant occurrence of mental i lness amongst in-
mates.0 These impairments were consistently seen across those in
204both state and federal custody and in both genders. It is also inter-
esting that younger inmates, those under twenty-four, had a higher
occurrence of mental illness than those a few decades older.20 As
these younger inmates seek to challenge their convictions, their own
mental deficiencies hamper their understanding of the law, their abil-
ity to communicate with the courts, and also to convey their legal is-
sues to the limited pool of pro bono legal representation. Further,
given that false confessions are one of the key indicators of a wrong-
201 Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 9-10.
202 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). As clearly demonstrated by Darryl Burton's
case, and numerous others, even for those with strong evidence of innocence, the burden
of proof cannot always be satisfied. See supra Part I.B.
203 See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 213600,
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf ("At midyear 2005 more than
half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem.").
204 [d.
205 Id. at 4.
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ful conviction and occur at a much higher rate amongst those with
mental disabilities, it is troubling that they are also the least likely to
navigate the complex legal process to gain relief.201
Fourth, compounding this problem is the relatively low education
level of many inmates. Approximately 40% of those in state prisons
have not obtained a high school diploma.2 07 The privatization of
prisons and decrease in educational opportunities in many institu-
tions causes this number to remain steady if not increase as those who
want to obtain education may not have the opportunities to do so.
These mental-health and educational deficiencies create a further
impediment to prisoners' ability to conduct investigations and timely file
petitions sufficient to obtain post-conviction relief: 'Given that many in-
mates do not have a high level of education and that many suffer from
mental illness, navigating the post-conviction appeals process poses, at the
very least, a daunting challenge.'2 0 8
Taking into account the individualized factors that may impair an
inmate's ability will help explain why he may not have the ability to
understand what he must file and when.
Finally, if the State objects to the delay in time that an inmate
takes beyond the one year statute of limitations, it needs to articulate
the actual prejudice it incurs from the delay. A consistent affirmative
defense states argue is laches or a timing-based argument as used in
Perkins, that such delay impairs the state from properly evaluating the
inmate's claims.2 09 Requiring the state to explain specifically the ac-
tual harm it suffers due to the delay makes a federal court assess
whether their arguments are valid. In some situations, the state raises
procedural defenses as a way to prevent a wrongfully convicted per-
son from getting proper evaluation of their newly discovered evi-
dence and supporting constitutional claims.1 0 If the state's argument
206 False Confessions or Adminsions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes-wrongful-conviction/false-confessions-or-admissions (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
207 CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 195670, EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 2 (2003).
208 Brief for the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note
55, at 29 (citing Amy Breglio, Note, Let Him Be Heard: The Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel on Post-Conviction Appeal in Capital Cases, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 247, 259
(2011)).
209 See Medwed, supra, note 59, at 693-94, 693 n.249 (describing the challenges states face
when allowing inmates more latitude to present new evidence).
210 See, e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the trial court
quashed Milke's subpoena for impeachment evidence based on the discoverability of the
evidence and the specificity of the claim, rather than on the standard set forth in Brady);
Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the Commonwealth's
assertions that the trial court erred "by generally excusing Wolfe's procedural defaults
under the Schlup actual innocence standard; by authorizing discovery and conducting the
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is meritorious, that it has actual impairment due to an inmate filing
beyond the statute of limitation, it should elaborate on obstacles their
investigators, support staff, or original prosecuting agency have in
finding people or locating evidence, to the district court.
A. Daniel Larsen: A Classic Example of How These Factors Would Impact A
Federal Habeas Case
A clear example of how a federal court can apply Perkins con-
sistent with these proposals is Larsen v. Soto.' On June 6, 1998, police
received an emergency call to respond to the Gold Apple Cocktail
Lounge in Los Angeles, California based on shots being fired and the
possibility of assault with a deadly weapon.1 According to the 911
call, the suspect wore a green shirt and a ponytail.1  Upon arrival,
police found several people in the parking lot whom they asked to get
on the ground." According to the testimony of two police officers at
the scene, Larsen "pulled a linear object, about five or six inches long
from his waistband and threw it underneath a nearby car."2" Larsen
also matched the suspect's description due to his green shirt; howev-
er, Larsen had a shaved head inconsistent with the initial descrip-
tion. Police placed Larsen under arrest and the prosecution later
charged him with felonious possession of a deadly weapon.2 " Due to
his past criminal history, this new charge qualified Larsen under Cali-
fornia Three Strikes Statute. He faced life imprisonment.
During his initial preliminary hearing, the judge dismissed the
charges against Larsen on the grounds that the prosecution failed to
prove concealment, an element under the statute.2" The prosecution
evidentiary hearing; and by allowing Wolfe to amend his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to
broaden his Brady claim to include the Newsome report and other newly disclosed evi-
dence"). Various constitutional claims have an actual prejudice element requiring a peti-
tioner to explain with specificity the actual prejudice or harm they incurred do to what-
ever deficiency they argue occurred. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (requiring actual prejudice as the second prong of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring materiality or actual
prejudice for the failure to disclose a specific piece of evidence).
211 742 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2013).
212 Id. at 1086; see also Maurice Possley, Daniel Larsen, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONORATIONS (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4350.
213 Larsen, 742 F.3d at 1086.
214 Id. at 1087.
215 Id. at 1086.
216 Possley, supra note 212.
217 Larsen, 742 F.3d at 1087.
218 Possley, supra note 212.
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brought the same charges a second time but this time, one of the two
arresting officers changed his story to provide a factual basis for the
concealment element absent from the initial case."' On June 23,
1999, a jury convicted Larsen and the trial court sentenced him un-
der the heightened sentence to twenty-eight years to life imprison-
ment.no
The California Innocence Project ("CAP") began reviewing
Larsen's case in 2004 and found newly discovered evidence establish-
ing his actual innocence.22 ' At this point, Larsen was well beyond the
one year statute of limitations for filing his federal petition. A year
later, CAP filed a state habeas corpus petition arguing that Larsen re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel as his trial attorney failed to
investigate the case prior to trial, failed to have the knife examined
for fingerprints, and did not produce third-party perpetrator evi-
dence.2 Demonstrating the actual prejudice Larsen incurred, CAP
presented declarations from several people who said he was not the
man with the knife. Instead, some of these new witnesses identified a
man nicknamed "Bunker" as having the knife.2 23 James McNutt, a re-
tired Army Sergeant First Class and former chief of police, not only
identified the alternate suspect, but provided the new suspect's mo-
tive for the crime. According to testimony, Bunker and Sergeant
McNutt's stepson, Daniel Harrison, argued resulting in Bunker
reaching into his pants taking out something looking like a knife.
Once the police arrived, it was Bunker, not Larsen who threw the
knife under the car. Sergeant McNutt's wife, Elinore, corroborated
this information. Both wondered why the police focused on Larsen
when, from their perspective, he had nothing to do with the situa-
225
tion.
Additional newly discovered evidence included admissions from
the man originally identified as Bunker, William Hewitt. Both Hewitt
and his girlfriend provided affidavits explaining that he, not Larsen,
threw the knife under the car.2 After learning of Larsen's arrest,
219 See id. (stating that the officer's new testimony asserted "that Larsen's shirt was untucked
and covered the knife, and that Larsen reached under his shirt, grabbed the knife and
threw it under the car").
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Larsen, 742 F.3d at 1087.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1087-88.
226 Id. at 1088.
Apr. 2016]1 1171
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Hewitt sold his motorcycle to bail Larsen out of jail.2 When asked
why he did not testify at Larsen's trial, he explained no one subpoe-
naed him.22 ' Even with this extensive evidence demonstrating how
Larsen's trial attorney conducted no investigation, which resulted in
Larsen's conviction, California appellate courts denied Larsen relief
without an evidentiary hearing.
Larsen then pursued federal habeas corpus relief arguing his ac-
tual innocence and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as his
constitutional claim.230  Even though Larsen acknowledged that he
was several years beyond the statute of limitations for filing his federal
petition, his actual innocence trumped the procedural bar in accord-
ance with Perkins.2 1' The federal magistrate granted Larsen an eviden-
tiary hearing on the limited question as to whether he met the Schlup
standard for actual innocence.2 2 He presented the witnesses whose
affidavits were initially presented in state collateral proceedings.233
These witnesses confirmed their original statements explaining the
events of that night, including the actions of the Los Angeles Police
234who originally responded to the scene.
One of the key facts revealed during the former police chiefs tes-
timony is that he was not initially contacted by anyone until two and a
half years after the crime." For several years after his conviction, but
prior to the California Innocence Project accepting his case, Larsen
attempted to obtain representation from other attorneys to help him
pursue his claims, but all of these attempts proved unfruitful.2" As is
often the case, Larsen was one of many inmates who try and try again
to find anyone who can assist them after direct appeal. These in-
mates understand that, without counsel who has the expertise and
training to find the newly discovered evidence and who are skilled or
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 1087-88; see also Possley, supra note 212.
230 Larsen, 742 F.3d at 1088.
231 Id. at 1088-89; see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 (2013) ("[A] first peti-
tion for federal habeas relief, the miscarriage ofjustice exception survived AEDPA's pas-
sage intact and unrestricted.").
232 Larsen, 742 F.3d at 1088-89.
233 Id. at 1089 (noting he called Sergeant McNutt, Elinor McNutt, and Brian McCraken).
234 Id. at 1090-91. Given that the State's case hung crucially on the testimony of several of-
ficers, the witness accounts of the police acting inconsistently would have been of great
importance to thejury. See Id. at 1091 ("[Magistrate Judge Segal] concluded that, in light
of the evidence Larsen presented, 'no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'").
235 Id. at 1089.
236 Id. at 1093.
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competent in weaving their cases through the mire of post-conviction
and federal habeas corpus, they are unlikely to be exonerated. While
Larsen was successful in obtaining counsel, Perkins, who presented
three witness affidavits gathered by his family, was not.
The magistrate judge found that Larsen proved his actual inno-
cence permitting his untimely constitutional claim substantive review.
She evaluated Larsen's evidence supporting his Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The magistrate found that
Larsen's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case
prior to trial.m The district court adopted the magistrate's findings
and ordered Larsen's release pending the prosecutor's office decid-
ing to retry him." The State appealed the decision.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused solely on whether Larsen's
habeas petition was validly before the district court given it was filed
beyond the statute of limitations. Applying Perkins to the case, the
court examined Larsen's actions from the time of his conviction to
his filing in federal court, specifically whether he had been inexplica-
bly dilatory."' Focusing on a finding of the magistrate that wrote the
reality for many wrongfully convicted persons, "no petitioner who is
actually innocent would choose to remain silent about his federal ha-
beas claims for more than a year.",2  The Court of Appeals went fur-
ther and documented every action Larsen took to get his trial counsel
to do his job, and to get the critical evidence before a court in some
substantive way:
At trial, [Larsen] pled not guilty. In his declaration in support of his
Petition, [Larsen] stated that he asked his trial attorney to present excul-
patory evidence from Hewitt, Owen, and others. When [Larsen] became
aware of the McNutts' exculpatory testimony, he asked his trial attorney
to move for a new trial and unequivocally stated, "I'm innocent."
[Larsen] continued to assert his innocence after his conviction. Be-
tween his conviction in 1999 and the start of the California Innocence
Project's representation in 2002, [Larsen] contacted nine different at-
241
torneys or legal organizations for assistance in proving his innocence.
Courts must take into account the specific actions of an inmate in
seeking assistance and trying to locate newly discovered evidence of
actual innocence. Larsen, while incarcerated, did everything in his
power to protect his rights within the limited power he possessed. He
was indigent, without the means either inside or outside to effectively
237 Id. at 1091.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1092-93.
240 Id. at 1092.
241 Id. at 1093.
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investigate his case beyond what little he knew of witnesses who could
corroborate his story. He told his trial attorney to pursue leads pre-
trial, but his counsel elected not to investigate or present exculpatory
evidence. Recognizing that Larsen had not "sat on his rights," the
Ninth Circuit affirmed his grant of relief.
Such analysis as applied by the Ninth Circuit, ensures that a
wrongfully convicted person is not unduly penalized when the factual
development of his claim takes considerably longer than 2244(d) an-
ticipated. Larsen's constitutional claim focused on the ineffective-
ness of his trial counsel, arguing directly to the underlying thread of
the importance of fact development for both innocence and effective
assistance of counsel. In both instances, when an investigation does
not occur as the Constitution intends during pretrial proceedings, it
inevitably will take longer for a wrongfully convicted inmate to ac-
quire evidence establishing innocence. As is the case, where the
McNutts moved out of California in the following years while Larsen
languished in prison, it is a reality that an inmate operates at a dis-
tinct disadvantage marshaling the resources necessary to locate and
interview witnesses who support his claim. There was no way for
him to contact them or bring them back for a hearing without the re-
sources of an innocence project or pro bono agency. This is exactly
the reason investigations go beyond the time allotted. When newly
discovered evidence and their accompanying constitutional claims
need concrete proof, that proof often scatters to the four winds.
After evaluating the reasons behind Larsen's delay, both the mag-
istrate and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the state's insin-
uation that the six year delay may have affected their ability to rebut
the newly discovered evidence presented.242 The state's concern fo-
cused on its inability to properly vet the credibility of the inmate's
factual evidence given the lapse of time. This argument is disingenu-
ous for two reasons. First, the state rarely addresses the facts of a case
during federal habeas corpus. Instead, it relies heavily on procedural
242 See id. at 1094 ("Furthermore, three years to locate witnesses scattered across the country,
gather declarations, and file Larsen's petition is not so lengthy a time as to be unreasona-
ble. Certainly, that his attorneys were thorough in preparing his petition does not un-
dermine the reliability of Larsen's evidence. And at any rate, the Warden has not ex-
plained why the California Innocence Project would choose to become complicit in
Larsen's supposed scheme to spare Hewitt from prosecution by delaying in filing the peti-
tion.").
243 Id. at 1094-95 ("Most importantly, the Warden has not explained how any delay in filing
by Larsen has prejudiced the State or benefitted Larsen.... For example, the Warden has
not argued that any prosecution witnesses who testified at Larsen's trial have since died or
become unavailable.").
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objections to the constitutional claims raised in federal habeas cor-
pus. The state is aware of the intricacies of federal habeas corpus and
knows inmates will be tripped up by these complexities. Often, in-
mates with viable constitutional claims are trapped in the mire of
procedural obstacles regardless of whether the state suffers any actual
harm because of them.2" Because a federal court must address the
procedural concerns before reaching the factual merits, the state
emphasizes these areas in hopes of thwarting any substantive review.
Even when newly discovered evidence is presented, there is no need
by the state to address it if they can focus on procedural affirmative
defenses to limit the scope of federal review.2 45 Both the federal court
and Ninth Circuit acknowledged that without more concrete proof of
injury, a bald assertion of the extra delay causing some demonstrable
harm is meritless.
Second, as the Court looks to evaluate newly discovered evidence
and constitutional claims, the credibility assessment looks to the rec-
ord as it existed at the time of trial. According to Schlup, federal
courts must determine whether a reasonable juror would still convict
the inmate had the juror been presented with the evidence of actual
innocence at the time of trial.24 As a federal court makes that deter-
mination, looking to the witness testimony and the prosecution's and
defense's arguments at trial determines whether the inmate has met
the burden.2 4 ' Because the innocence assessment is backward look-
ing, the State cannot change tact or replace a better argument now
for the one the jury heard when it chose to convict. The record as it
existed originally is what is evaluated to determine the value of the
new evidence and constitutional issues. As the trial transcript and
pretrial documentation speak for itself, there is little actual harm suf-
fered by the State due to a delay. Arguing a new theory of the case to
address newly discovered evidence of innocence does not coincide
with the cumulative assessment precedent requires.
The magistrate judge emphasized that a laches-type argument
must be accompanied by some demonstration of actual prejudice if it
will suffice as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court cautioned
against a similar argument when emphasizing that a merits assess-
244 Exhaustion is required due to comity between the state and federal courts. Procedural
bars are upheld even when state courts give no explanation as to why they were imposed.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011).
245 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
246 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995).
247 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522-23, 531-33 (2006).
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ment must occur when the stakes are this high.24' Asking the State to
articulate some clear, demonstrative harm by the inmate's delay en-
sures that if the delay is a problem, it can be addressed during an evi-
dentiary hearing where witnesses for both the State and defense
could testify. Further, both sides could fully articulate their positions.
However, a state's weak explanation that some of the trial witnesses
have died does not qualify given that the trial testimony already exists
and will be accepted as true. Unless the state can explain how the
trial record is deficient in some way or how the newly discovered evi-
dence changes it in some irreparable way, the argument should fall to
viable evidence of innocence. Seeing as newly discovered evidence of
innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and official misconduct
claims require a cumulative assessment of the evidence not presented
at trial along with the new evidence uncovered, the state must show
some actual, demonstrative harm for the time beyond the statute of
limitations. Without showing such, federal courts, like the magis-
trate in Larsen, should dismiss such arguments as meritless.
CONCLUSION
Six years is the difference between a finding of innocence and
not. For Perkins, the six year period between his last state filing and
his federal habeas petition was too much but for Larsen, it was under-
standable. The difference between the two comes down to counsel.
As the Court long ago recognized, " [t] he right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel.,25 0  However, the right to counsel extends only
through trial proceedings and a defendant's first appeal. Such re-
strictions leave inmates to fend for themselves as they navigate the
next two levels of criminal appeals. Given the complexity of the state
collateral system and federal habeas corpus, few inmates, much less
the wrongfully convicted, will be able to successfully navigate this
minefield without competent legal assistance. Without counsel, navi-
248 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct 1924, 1936 (2013) (arguing for a distinct dilligence find-
ing because, "[t]he State fears that a prisoner might 'lie in wait and use stale evidence to
collaterally attack his conviction ... when an elderly witness has died and cannot appear
at a hearing to rebut new evidence.'").
249 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-16 (discussing newly discovered evidence in light of the strength
of the State's case at trial); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995) (explaining how
Brady evidence must be evaluated cumulatively both with the evidence presented and the
evidence impermissibly withheld); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000)
(explaining the cumulative review of both evidence presented at trial and evidence trial
counsel failed to present under ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
250 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
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gating the wrongfully convicted to find the evidence necessary to ex-
onerate them is almost impossible. As the Supreme Court continues
to make in-roads to allow inmates blocked by increasingly unsympa-
thetic state collateral process, such flexibility must be even greater for
the actually innocent. While the Court believes that wrongful convic-
tions are a small subset, the sheer numbers and frequency of exoner-
ations challenges this belief. Federal courts must continue to provide
flexibility to those seeking relief from wrongful convictions when they
take additional time not only to find evidence establishing innocence
but wait even longer for counsel to assist them. Innocence is hard
enough to prove both factually and legally. It is time the federal
courts embraced this fully.
